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Abstract
The education system for students in physics suffers (worldwide)
from the absence of a deep course in probability and randomness. This
is the real problem for students interested in quantum information the-
ory, quantum optics, and quantum foundations. Here the primitive
treatment of probability and randomness may lead to deep misunder-
standings of theory and wrong interpretations of experimental results.
Since during my visits (in 2013 and 2014) to IQOQI a number of
students (experimenters!) asked me permanently about foundational
problems of probability and randomness, especially inter-relation be-
tween classical and quantum structures, this year I gave two lectures
on these problems. Surprisingly the interest of experiment-oriented
students to mathematical peculiarities was very high. This (as well as
permanent reminding of prof. Zeilinger) motivated me to write a text
based on these lectures which were originally presented in the tradi-
tional black-board form. I hope that this might be useful for students
from IQOQI as well as other young physicists.
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1 Kolmogorov axiomatics of probabil-
ity theory
1.1 Historical remarks
We start with the remark that, opposite to geometry, axiomatic prob-
ability theory was created not so long ago. Soviet mathematician
Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov presented the modern axiomatics of
probability theory only in 1933 in his book [18]. The book was orig-
inally published in German.1 The English translation [19] was pub-
lished only in 1952 (and the Russian version [20] only in 1974). The
absence of the English translation soon (when the German language
lost its international dimension) led to the following problem. The
majority of the probabilistic community did not have a possibility to
read Kolmogorov. Their picture of the Kolmogorov model was based
on its representations in English (and Russian) language textbooks.
Unfortunately, in such representations a few basic ideas of Kolmogorov
disappeared, since they were considered as just philosophic “bla-bla”
having no value for mathematics. Partially this is correct, but prob-
ability theory is not just mathematics. This is a physical theory and,
as any physical theory, its mathematical formalism has to be endowed
with some interpretation. In Kolmogorov’s book the interpretation
question was discussed in very detail. However, in majority of math-
ematical representations of Kolmogorov’s approach the interpretation
issue is not enlighten at all.
It is interesting that the foundations of quantum probability theory
were set practically at the same time as the foundations of classical
probability theory. In 1935 John von Neumann [32] pointed that clas-
sical randomness is fundamentally different from quantum random-
ness. The first one is “reducible randomness”, i.e., it can be reduced
to variation of features of systems in an ensemble. It can be also
called ensemble randomness. The second one is “irreducible random-
ness”, i.e., aforementioned ensemble reduction is impossible. By von
Neumann quantum randomness is an individual randomness, even an
individual electron exhibits fundamentally random behavior. By him
only quantum randomness is genuine randomness.
Already now we emphasize that, although the notion of random-
ness is closely related to the notion of probability, they do not coincide.
We can say that the problems of creation of proper mathematical for-
malizations of classical and quantum probabilities were solved. How-
1The language and the publisher (Springer) were chosen by rather pragmatic reason.
Springer paid by gold and young Kolmogorov needed money and gold was valuable even
in Soviet Union.
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ever, as we shall see, mathematics was unable (in spite of one hundred
years of tremendous efforts) to provide proper formalization of neither
classical nor quantum randomness.
1.2 The interpretation problem in quantum
mechanics and classical probability theory
We turn to the interpretation problem of classical probability theory,
see [12], [13] for a detailed presentation, in comparison with the in-
terpretation problem of quantum mechanics (QM). The latter is well
known, it is considered as one of foundational problems of QM. The
present situation is characterized by huge diversity of interpretations.
And this is is really unacceptable for a scientific theory. As all we
know, those interpretations are not just slight modifications of each
other. They differ fundamentally: the Copenhagen interpretation of
Bohr2, Heisenberg, Pauli (“shut up and calculate”), the ensemble or
statistical interpretation of Einstein3, Margenau, Ballentine (QM is a
version of classical statistical mechanics with may be very tricky phase
space), many worlds interpretation (no comment), ..., the Va¨xjo¨ in-
terpretation (the wave particle duality is resolved in favor of waves, a
la early Schro¨dinger and the Devil is not in waves, but in detectors,
a kind of combination of the ensemble and Copenhagen operational
interpretations; however,with ensembles of waves and not particles).4
Our main message is that the problem of finding of proper interpre-
tations of classical probability and randomness is not less complex. It is
also characterized by huge diversity of variants, e.g., measure-theoretic
probability, frequency probability, subjective (Bayesian) probability,
... and randomness as unpredictability, randomness as complexity,
randomness as typicality,....
2It is not well known that originally Niels Bohr was convinced to proceed with the
operational interpretation of QM by the Soviet physicist Vladimir Fock, the private com-
munication of Andrei Grib who read the correspondence between Bohr and Fock in which
Fock advertised actively the “Copenhagen interpretation”.
3Initially Schro¨dinger also kept to this interpretation. Nowadays it is practically forgot-
ten that he elaborated his example with (Schro¨dinger) Cat and Poison just to demonstrate
the absurdness of the Copenhagen interpretation. This example was, in fact, just a slight
modification of Einstein’s example with Man and Gun in his letter to Schro¨dinger. How-
ever, finally Schro¨dinger wrote to Einstein that he found very difficult if possible at all to
explain the interference on the basis of the ensemble interpretation, so he gave up.
4 We can point to the series of the Va¨xjo¨ conferences on quantum foundations where
all possible interpretations were discussed and attacked during the last 15 years (see, e.g.,
lnu.se/qtap and lnu.se/qtpa for the last conferences and the book [11] devoted to this
series). However, in spite of in general the great value of such foundational debates, the
interpretation picture of QM did not become clearer.
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It is interesting that nowadays in probability theory the problem
of interpretation is practically ignored. One can say that the majority
of the probability community proceed under the same slogan as the
majority of the quantum community: “shut up and calculate”.( Par-
tially this is a consequence of the common treatment of probability
theory as a theoretical formalism. Questions of applicability of this
formalism are treated by statistics. Here the interpretation questions
play an important role, may be even more important than in QM.
By keeping to different interpretations (e.g., frequency and Bayesian)
researchers can come to very different conclusions based on the same
statistical data; different interpretations generate different methods of
analysis of data, e.g., frequentists operate with confidence intervals
estimates and Baeysians with credible intervals estimates. Opposite
to QM, it seems that nowadays in probability theory and statistics
nobody expects that a “really proper interpretation” would be finally
created.
The situation with randomness-interpretations is more similar to
QM. It is characterized by practically one hundred years of discussions
on possible interpretations of randomness. Different interpretations
led to different theories of randomness. Numerous attempts to elabo-
rate a “really proper interpretation” of randomness have not yet lead
to a commonly acceptable conclusion. Nevertheless, there are still ex-
pectations that a new simple and unexpected idea will come to life and
a rigorous mathematical model based on the commonly acceptable no-
tion of randomness will be created (this was one of the last messages
of Andrei Kolmogorov before his death, the private communication of
Albert Shiryaev).
There is the opinion (not so common) that the interpretation prob-
lem of QM simply reflects the interpretation problem of probabil-
ity/statistics/randomness; e.g., Zeilinger’s information interpretation
[36] of QM (see also the series of works of Brukner and Zeilinger [35],
[36], [3]-[5] and D’ Ariano et al. [7]) is a quantum physical represen-
tation of Kolmogorov’s complexity/information interpretation [21, 22,
23] of classical randomness (also Chaitin [6]); the Fuchs [8, 9, 10] sub-
jective probability interpretation of QM is nothing else than an appli-
cation of the Bayesian interpretation of probability to QM, the Va¨xjo¨
interpretation [14], [15] is an attempt to apply to QM a combination
of measure-theoretic and frequency interpretations of probability.
Finally, we remark that von Neumann considered the frequency in-
terpretation probability of von Mises [29, 30, 31] as the most adequate
to the Copenhagen interpretation of QM (a footnote in his book [32],
see also [11]).
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1.3 Events as sets and probability as measure
on a family of sets representing events
The crucial point of the Kolmogorov approach is the representation of
random events by subsets of some basic set Ω. This set is considered
as sample space - the collection of all possible realizations of some
experiment.5 Points of sample space are called elementary events.
The collection of subsets representing random events should be
sufficiently rich – to be able to perform the set-theoretic operations
such as the intersection, the union, and the difference of sets. However,
at the same time it should not be too extended. If a too extended
system of subsets is selected to represent events, then it may contain
“events” which cannot be interpreted in any reasonable way.
After selection of a proper system of sets to represent events, one
assigns weights to these subsets:
A 7→ P (A). (1)
The probabilistic weights are chosen to be nonnegative real numbers
and normalized by sum up to 1: P (Ω) = 1, the probability that some-
thing happens equals one.
Interpretation: An event with large weight is more probable
than an event with small weight. (This is only a part of Kolmogorov’s
interpretation of probability, see section 3.3).
We now discuss another feature of the probabilistic weights: the
weight of an event A that can be represented as the disjoint union of
events A1 and A2 is equal to the sum of weights of these events. The
latter property is called additivity. (There is the evident similarity
with mass, area, volume.)
It is useful to impose some restrictions on the system of sets rep-
resenting events:
• a) set Ω containing all possible events and the empty set ∅ are
events (something happens and nothing happens);
• b) the union of two sets representing events represents an event;
• c) the intersection of two sets representing events represents an
event;
5Consider an experiment corresponding to the n-times coin tossing. Each realization of
this experiment generates a vector ω = {x1, ..., xn}, where xj = H or T. Thus the sample
space of this experiment contains 2n points. We remark that this (commonly used) sample
space is based on outputs of the observable corresponding to coin’s sides and not on so to
say hidden parameters of the coin and the hand leading to these outputs. Later we shall
discuss this problem in more detail.
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• d) the complement of a set representing an event, i.e., the collec-
tion of all points that do not belong to this set, again represents
an event.
These set-theoretic operations correspond to the basic operations
of classical Boolean logics: “or”, “and”, “no”. And the modern set-
theoretic representation of events is a mapping of propositions describ-
ing events onto sets with preservation of the logical structure.6 The
set-system with properties a)-d) is called the algebra of sets (in the
American literature, the field of sets).
1.4 The role of countable-additivity (σ-additivity)
In the case of finite Ω the map given by (1) with the above-mentioned
properties gives the simplest example of Kolmogorov’s measure-theoretic
probability. (Since Ω can contain billions of points, this model is useful
in a huge class of applications.) Here Ω = {ω1, ..., ωN}. To determine
any map (1), it is enough to assign to each point ω ∈ Ω its weight
0 ≤ P (ωj) ≤ 1,
∑
j
P (ωj) = 1.
Then by additivity this map is extended to the set-algebra consisting
of all subsets of Ω :
P (A) =
∑
{ωj∈A}
P (ωj).
However, if Ω is countable, i.e., it is infinite and its points can be
enumerated, or “continuous” – e.g., a segment of the real line R, then
simple additivity is not sufficient to create a fruitful mathematical
model. The map (1) has to be additive with respect to countable
unions of disjoint events (σ-additivity)7:
P (A1 ∪ ... ∪An ∪ ...) = P (A1) + ...+ P (An) + ..., (2)
and to work fruitfully with such maps (e.g., to integrate), one has to
impose special restrictions on the system of sets representing events.
It has to be not simply a set-algebra, but a σ-algebra of sets (in
the American literature, a σ-field), i.e., b) and c) must be valid for
countable unions and intersections of sets. In the logical terms, it
6At the beginning of the mathematical formalization of probability theory the map (1)
was defined on an algebraic structure corresponding to the logical structure, the Boolean
algebra (invented by J. Boole, the creator of “Boolean logic”.)
7Here σ is a symbol for “countably”.
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means that the operations “or” and “and” can be applied infinitely
many times to form new events.
Of course, this is a mathematical idealization of the real situation.
Kolmogorov pointed out [18, 19, 20] that, since in real experiments
it is impossible to “produce” infinitely many events, this condition is
not experimentally testable. He would prefer to proceed with finite-
additive probabilities. However, without σ-additivity it is difficult
(although possible) to define the integral with respect a probability
measure (Lebesgue integral is well defined only for σ-additive mea-
sures) and, hence, to define the mathematical expectation (the average
operation).
One of the most important “continuous probability models” is
based on the sample space Ω = R, i.e., elementary events are repre-
sented by real numbers. Typically a σ-algebra is selected as the Borel
σ-algebra: it is generated by all half-open intervals, [α, β), α < β, with
the aid of the operations of the union, intersection, and complement.
We remark that in the case of “continuous” Ω it is not easy to define
σ-algebras explicitly. Therefore one typically selects some simple sys-
tem of subsets of Ω and then considers a minimal σ-algebra generated
by this system.
1.5 Probability space
Let Ω be a set and let F be a σ-algebra of its subsets. A probability
measure P is a map from F to the segment [0, 1] normalized P (Ω) = 1
and σ-additive, i.e., the equality (2) holds for disjoint sets belonging
to F .
By the Kolmogorov axiomatics [18] the probability space is a triple
P = (Ω, F , P ).
Points ω of Ω are said to be elementary events, elements of F are
random events, P is probability.
Remark 1. (Elementary events and random events). This termi-
nology used by Kolmogorov is a bit misleading. In fact, one has to
distinguish elementary events from random events. The crucial point
is that in general single point set Aω = {ω}, where ω is one of points of
Ω, need not belong to the σ-algebra of events F . In such a case we can-
not assign the probability value to Aω. Thus some elementary events
are so to say hidden; although they are present mathematically at the
set-theoretical level, we cannot assign to them the probability-values.
One can consider the presence of such hidden elementary events as a
classical analog of hidden variables in QM, although the analogy is
not complete.
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Example 1. Let the sample space Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} and let the
collection (algebra) of events F consist of the following subsets of
Ω : {∅,Ω, A = {ω1, ω2}, B = {ω3}}, and P (A) = P (B) = 1/2. Here
the elementary single point events {ω1}, {ω2} are not “physically ap-
proachable”. (Of course, this analogy is only indirect.) Interpretations
of the existence of “hidden elementary events” were not discussed so
much in classical probability. There exist realizations of the experi-
ment (represented by the probability space P with this property) such
that it is in principle impossible to assign probabilities to them, even
zero probability. We shall come back to this problem by discussing
the classical probabilistic representation of observables.
2 Observables as random variables
Random observations are represented by random variables. We start
with mathematically simplest random variables, the discrete ones.
Discrete random variables on the Kolmogorov space P are by defi-
nition functions a : Ω→ Xa, whereXa = {α1, ..., αn, ...} is a countable
set (the range of values) such that the sets
Caα = {ω ∈ Ω : a(ω) = α}, α ∈ Xa, (3)
belong to F . Thus classical probability theory is characterized by the
functional representation of observables. For each elementary event
ω ∈ Ω, there is assigned the value of the observable a, i.e., α = a(ω).
This is the a-observation on the realization ω of the experiment.
It is typically assumed that the range of values Xa is a subset of
the real line. We will proceed under this assumption.
Remark 2. (Observations and hidden elementary events). Let
the system of events F do not contain the single-point set for some
ω0 ∈ Ω. Thus the probability cannot be assigned to the ω0-outcome of
the random experiment. Nevertheless, this realization can happen and
even the value of each observable is well defined: a(ω0). However, we
cannot “extract” information about this elementary event with the
class of observables corresponding to the selected probability space.
Consider the space from the Example 1; let ω → a(ω) be a random
variable, αj = a(ωj). Suppose that α1 6= α2. Then the sets C
a
αj
=
{ωj}. However, the single point sets {ωj}, j = 1, 2, do not belong to
F . Hence, we have to assume that α1 = α2. And this the general
situation: we cannot distinguish such elementary events with the aid
of observations.
The probability distribution of a (discrete) random variable a is
defined as pa(α) ≡ P (ω ∈ Ω : a(ω) = α). The average (mathematical
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expectation) of a random variable a is defined as
a¯ ≡ Ea = α1 p
a(α1) + ...+ αn p
a(αn) + .... (4)
If the set of values of ξ is infinite, then the average is well defined if
the series in the right-hand side of (4) converges absolutely.
Suppose now that the results of random measurement cannot be
represented by a finite or countable set. Thus such an observable
cannot be represented as a discrete random variable.
A random variable on the Kolmogorov space P is by definition
any function ξ : Ω → R such that for any set Γ belonging to the
Borel σ-algebra, its pre-image belongs to the σ-algebra of events F :
ξ−1(Γ) ∈ F , where ξ−1(Γ) = {ω ∈ Ω : ξ(ω) ∈ Γ}.
In this case the mathematical formalism is essentially more compli-
cated. The main mathematical difficulty is to define the integral with
respect to a probability measure on F , the Lebesgue integral [18]. In
fact, classical probability theory, being based on measure theory, is
mathematically more complicated than quantum probability theory.
In the latter integration is replaced by the trace operation for linear
operators and the trace is always the discrete sum. Here we do not
plan to present the theory of Lebesgue integration. We formally invent
the symbol of integration.8
The average (mathematical expectation) of a random variable a is
defined as
a¯ ≡ Ea =
∫
Ω
ξ(ω)dP (ω). (5)
The probability distribution of a random variable a is defined (for
Borel subsets of the real line) as pa(Γ) ≡ P (ω ∈ Ω : a(ω) ∈ Γ). This
is a probability measure on the Borel σ-algebra. And the calculation
of the average can be reduced to integration with respect to pa : a¯ ≡
Ea =
∫
R
x dpa(x).
3 Conditional probability; independence
Kolmogorov’s probability model is based on a probability space equipped
with the operation of conditioning. In this model conditional proba-
bility is defined by the well known Bayes’ formula
P (B|C) = P (B ∩ C)/P (C), P (C) > 0. (6)
8We remark that, for a discrete random variable, the integral coincides with the sum
for the mathematical expectation, see (4). And a discrete random variable is integrable
if its mathematical expectation is well defined. In general any integrable random variable
can be approximated by integrable discrete random variables and its integral is defined as
the limit of the integrals for the approximating sequence.
9
By Kolmogorov’s interpretation it is the probability of an event B to
occur under the condition that an event C has occurred. We emphasize
that the Bayes formula is simply a definition, not a theorem; it is
neither axiom (the latter was stressed by Kolmogorov); we shall see
that in the frequency approach to probability the Baeys formula is a
theorem.
We remark that conditional probability (for the fixed condition-
ing C)) PC(B) ≡ P (B|C) is again a probability measure on F . For
a set C ∈ F , P (C) > 0, and a (discrete) random variable a, the con-
ditional probability distribution is defined as paC(α) ≡ P (a = α|C).
We naturally have paC(α1) + ... + p
a
C(αn) + ... = 1, p
a
C(αn) ≥ 0. The
conditional expectation of a (discrete) random variable a is defined by
E(a|C) = α1 p
a
C(α1) + ...+ αn p
a
C(αn) + ....
Again by definition two events A and B are independent if
P (A ∩B) = P (A)P (B) (7)
In the case of nonzero probabilities P (A), P (B) > 0 independence can
be formulated in terms of conditional probability:
P (A|B) = P (A) (8)
or equivalently
P (B|A) = P (B). (9)
The relation of independence is symmetric: if A is independent of B,
i.e., (8) holds, then B is independent of A, i.e., (9) holds, and vice
versa. (We remark that this property does not match completely with
our intuitive picture of independence.)
3.1 Formula of total probability
In our further considerations the important role will be played by
the formula of total probability (FTP). This is a theorem of the Kol-
mogorov model. Let us consider a countable family of disjoint sets
Ak belonging to F such that their union is equal to Ω and P (Ak) >
0, k = 1, .... Such a family is called a partition of the space Ω.
Theorem 1. Let {Ak} be a partition. Then, for every set B ∈ F ,
the following formula of total probability holds
P (B) = P (A1)P (B|A1) + ...+ P (Ak)P (B|Ak) + .... (10)
Proof. We have
P (B) = P (B ∩ (∪∞k=1Ak)) =
∞∑
k=1
P (B ∩Ak) =
∞∑
k=1
P (Ak)
P (B ∩Ak)
P (Ak)
.
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Especially interesting for us is the case where a partition is induced
by a discrete random variable a taking values {αk}. Here,
Ak = {ω ∈ Ω : a(ω) = αk}. (11)
Let b be another random variable. It takes values {βj}. For any β ∈
Xb, we have
P (b = β) =
∑
k
P (a = αk)P (b = β|a = αk) (12)
This is the basic formula of the Bayesian analysis. The value of
the probability to obtain the result β in the b-measurement can be
estimated on the basis of conditional probabilities for this result (with
respect to the results of the a-measurement).
3.2 The Kolmogorov strong law of large num-
bers
Consider a sequence of identically distributed and independent ran-
dom variables ξ1, ..., ξN , ..., with average m = Eξj . Then by the strong
law of large numbers we have:
P
(
ω ∈ Ω :
ξ1(ω) + ...+ ξN (ω)
N
→ m,N →∞
)
= 1, (13)
i.e.,
lim
N→∞
ξ1(ω) + ...+ ξN (ω)
N
= m
almost everywhere (on the set of probability 1).
This law is the basic law guaranteeing the applicability of the Kol-
mogorov measure-theoretic model to experimental data. It was proven
by Kolmogorov and this was the important step in justification of his
model.
The main interpretation problem related to this law is of the fol-
lowing nature. Although the Kolmogorov strong law of large numbers
implies that the set of elementary events for which the arithmetic
mean converges to the probabilistic mean m is very large (from the
measure-theoretic viewpoint), for the concrete ω (concrete sequence of
experimental trials), this law cannot provide any information whether
this convergence take place or not. In fact, this was the main argument
of von Mises (the creator of frequency probability theory) against the
Kolmogorov measure-theoretic model, see the remark at the very end
of section 4.
Consider now some event A, i.e., A ∈ F , and generate a sequence
of independent tests in which the event A either happen or not. In the
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Kolmogorov model this sequence of experimental trials is described by
a sequence of independent random variables, ξj = 1 if A happens and
ξj = 0 in the opposite case. Then the frequency of the A-occurence,
νN (A) = n(A)/N, can be represented as
νN (A) =
ξ1(ω) + ...+ ξN (ω)
N
.
Hence, the strong law of large numbers, in particular, implies that
probabilities of events are approximated by relative frequencies.
3.3 Kolmogorov’s interpretation of probabil-
ity
Kolmogorov proposed [18] to interpret probability as follows: “[. . . ]
we may assume that to an event A which may or may not occur under
conditions Σ is assigned a real number P (A) which has the following
characteristics:
• (a) one can be practically certain that if the complex of condi-
tions Σ is repeated a large number of times, N, then if n be the
number of occurrences of event A, the ratio n/N will differ very
slightly from P (A);
• (b) if P (A) is very small, one can be practically certain that
when conditions Σ are realized only once the event A would not
occur at all.”
The (a)-part of this interpretation is nothing else than the fre-
quency interpretation of probability, cf. with von Mises theory and his
principle of the statistical stabilization of relative frequencies, section
4. In the measure-theoretic approach this viewpoint to probability
is justified by the law of large numbers. However, for Kolmogorov
approximation of probability by frequencies was not the only charac-
teristic feature of probability. The (b)-part also plays an important
role. This is the purely weight-type argument: if the weight assigned
to an event is very small than one can expect that such an event will
practically never happen. (Of course, here the meaning of “practi-
cally” is the subject for a discussion.)
3.4 Random vectors; existence of joint proba-
bility distribution
In the Kolmogorov model a system of observables is represented by a
vector of random variables a = (a1, ..., an). Its probability distribution
12
is defined as
pa(A1 × · · · ×An) = P (ω : a1(ω) ∈ A1, · · · , an(ω) ∈ An). (14)
Thus, for any finite system of observables, it is assumed that the joint
probability distribution exists.
We remark that, for any subset of indexes i1, ..., ik , the probability
distribution of the vector (ai1 , ..., aik ), pai1 ,...,aik (Ai1 × ... × Aik) =
P (ω ∈ Ω : ai1(ω) ∈ Ai1 , ..., aik (ω) ∈ Aik), can be obtained from pa
as its marginal distribution. For example, consider a pair of discrete
observables a = (a1, a2). Then
pa1(α1) =
∑
α2
pa(α1, α2); pa2(α2) =
∑
α1
pa(α1, α2). (15)
In discussions related to Bell’s inequality these conditions of the marginal
consistency are known as no-signaling conditions.
Consider now a triple of discrete observables a = (a1, a2, a3). Then
pa1,a2(α1, α2) =
∑
α3
pa(α1, α2, α3), ..., pa2 ,a3(α2, α3) =
∑
α1
pa(α1, α2, α3).
(16)
One dimensional distributions can be obtained from the two dimen-
sional distributions in the same way as in (15).
We remark that the possibility to represent the two dimensional
probability distributions as marginals of the joint probability distribu-
tion is the basic assumption for derivation of the Bell-type inequalities.
In the second lecture we shall discuss this point in more detail.
We remark that in probability theory the problem of representation
of a family of observables by random variables on the same probability
space has the long history. Already G. Boole [1], [2] considered the
following problem. There are given three observables a1, a2, a3 = ±1
and their pairwise probability distributions paiaj . Is it possible to find
a discrete probability measure p(α1, α2, α3) such that all paiaj can be
obtained as the marginal probability distributions? And he showed
that the inequality which nowadays is known as the Bell inequality is a
necessary condition for the existence of such p. (At that time measure
theory had not yet been well developed and he used the algebraic for-
malism for probability based on Boolean algebras.) For Boole, it was
not self-evident that any family of observables can be described with
the aid of a single probability space. He understood well that if data
can be collected only for pairwise measurements, but it is impossible
to measure jointly the triple, then it can happen that the “Boole-Bell
inequality” is violated. For him, such a violation does not mean a
violation of the laws of classical probability theory. From the very
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beginning classical probability theory was developed as theory about
observable events and the corresponding probabilities. Roughly speak-
ing probability distributions of “hidden variables” and counterfactuals
were completely foreign for the creators of the probability theory. A.
N. Kolmogorov pointed out [19], section 2, that each complex of ex-
perimental physical conditions determines its own probability space.
In the general setup he did not discuss the possibility to represent the
data collected for different (may be incompatible) experimental condi-
tions with the aid of a single probability space, cf. with Boole [1], [2].
Therefore we do not know his opinion about this problem. However,
he solved positively this problem in one very important case. This
is the famous Kolmogorov theorem guaranteeing the existence of the
probability distribution for any stochastic process, see section 3.5.
In 1962 the Soviet probabilist N. N. Vorob’ev [33] presented the
complete solution of the problem of the existence of the joint probabil-
ity distribution for any family of discrete random variables. He used
his criteria for problems of game theory (the existence of a mixed
strategy) and in random optimization problems (the existence of an
optimal solution). However, the reaction of the Soviet probabilistic
school (at that time it was one of the strongest in the world) to his at-
tempt to to go beyond the Kolmogorov axiomatics was very negative.
His work [33] was completely forgotten. Only in 2005 it was “found”
by Karl Hess and Walter Philipp and used in the Bell debate. We
remark that in the probabilistic community the general tendency was
to try to find conditions of the existence a single probability space.
Therefore the works in which non-existence was the main point were
(consciously or unconsciously) ignored. In particular, even the afore-
mentioned works of G. Boole were also completely forgotten. Around
2000 they were “found” by Itamar Pitowsky who used them in the
Bell debate.
Finally, we formulate the following fundamental problem: Can
quantum probabilistic data be described by the classical (Kolmogorov)
probability model?
It seems that, since the (Boole-)Bell inequality is a necessary con-
dition for the existence of such a description and since it is violated for
the quantum probabilistic data, these data cannot be embedded in the
Kolmogorov model. However, the real situation is more complicated
and it will be discussed in the second lecture, see also [17].
3.5 Stochastic processes
The notion of a random vector is generalized to the notion of a stochas-
tic process. Suppose that the set of indexes is infinite; for example,
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at, t ∈ [0,+∞). Suppose that, for each finite set (t1...tk), the vector
(at1 ...atk) can be observed and its probability distribution pt1...tk is
given. By selecting Ωt1...tk = R
k, Pt1...tk = pt1...tk , and Fk as the Borel
σ-algebra for Rk, we obtain the probability space Pt1...tk describing
measurements at points t1...tk. At the beginning of 20th century the
main mathematical question of probability theory was whether it is
possible to find a single probability space P = (Ω,F , P ) such that all
at be represented as random variables on this space and all probability
distributions pt1...tk are induced by the same P :
pt1...tk(A1 × · · · ×Ak) = P (ω ∈ Ω : at1(ω) ∈ A1, , atn(ω) ∈ An).
Kolmogorov found natural conditions for the system of measures pt1...tk
which guarantee existence of such a probability space, see [18].9 And
during the next 80 years analysis of properties of (finite and infinite)
families of random variables defined on one fixed probability space was
the main activity in probability theory.
The Kolmogorov conditions are necessary and sufficient and their
are formulated as
• For any permutation s1...sk of indexes t1...tk,
pt1...tk(At1 × ...×Atk) = ps1...sk(As1 × ...×Ask).
• For two sets of indexes t1...tk and r1, .., rm,
pt1...tkr1...rm(At1× ...×Atk×R× ...×R) = pt1...tk(At1× ...×Atk).
4 Frequency (vonMises) theory of prob-
ability
Von Mises (1919) theory was the first probability theory [29, 30, 31]
based fundamentally on the principle of the stabilization of statistical
frequencies. Although this principle was heuristically used from the
very beginning of probabilistic studies, only von Mises tried to for-
malize it mathematically and to put it as one of the basic principles
of probability theory. His theory is based on the notion of a collective
(random sequence).
9We remark that the Ω is selected as the set of all trajectories t → ω(t). The random
variable at is defined as at(ω) = ω(t). Construction of the probability measure P serving
for all finite random vectors is mathematically advanced and going back to construction
of the Wiener measure on the space of continuous functions.
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Consider a random experiment S and denote by L = {α1, ..., αm}
the set of all possible results of this experiment10. The set L is said
to be the label set, or the set of attributes of the experiment S. We
consider only finite sets L. Let us consider N trials for this S and
record its results, xj ∈ L. This process generates a finite sample:
x = (x1, ..., xN}, xj ∈ L. (17)
A collective is an infinite idealization of this finite sample:
x = (x1, ..., xN , ...}, xj ∈ L, (18)
for which the following two von Mises principles are valid.
Principle 1 (statistical stabilization).
This is the principle of the statistical stabilization of relative fre-
quencies of each attribute α ∈ L of the experiment S in the sequence
(18). Take the frequencies
νN (α;x) =
nN (α;x)
N
where νN (α;x) is the number of appearance of the attribute α in
the first N trials. By the principle of the statistical stabilization the
frequency νN (α;x) approaches a limit as N approaches infinity for
every label α ∈ L.
This limit
Px(α) = lim
N→∞
νN (α;x)
is called the probability of the attribute α of the random experiment S.
Sometimes (when the random experiment and the collective gen-
erated by it are fixed) this probability will be denoted simply as P (α)
(although von Mises would be really angry; he always wrote that op-
eration with abstract probabilistic symbols, i.e., having no relation to
random experiment, is meaningless and may lead to paradoxic con-
clusions). We now cite von Mises [30]:
“We will say that a collective is a mass phenomenon or a repetitive
event, or simply a long sequence of observations for which there are
sufficient reasons to believe that the relative frequency of the observed
attribute would tend to a fixed limit if the observations were infinitely
10R. von Mises did not consider probability theory as a purely mathematical theory.
He emphasized that this is a physical theory such as, e.g., hydrodynamics. Therefore his
starting point is a physical experiment which is a structure from physics and not from
mathematics. He was criticized for mixing physics and mathematics. But he answered
that there is no way to proceed with probability as a purely mathematical entity, cf. with
remark of A. Zeilinger on the notion of randomness, section 5.4.
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continued. This limit will be called the probability of the attribute
considered within the given collective”.
Principle 2 (randomness).
Heuristically it is evident that we cannot consider, for example,
the sequence
x = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, ...)
as the output of a random experiment. However, the principle of
the statistical stabilization holds for x and Px(0) = Px(1) = 1/2. To
consider sequences (18) as objects of probability theory, we have to
put an additional constraint on them:
The limits of relative frequencies have to be stable with respect to
a place selection (a choice of a subsequence) in (18).
In particular, z does not satisfy this principle.11
However, this very natural notion (randomness) was the hidden
bomb in the foundations of von Mises’ theory. The main problem was
to define a class of place selections which induces a fruitful theory.
The main and very natural restriction which was set by von Mises is
that a place selection in (18) cannot be based on the use of attributes
of elements. For example, one cannot consider a subsequence of (18)
constructed by choosing elements with the fixed label α ∈ L. Von
Mises defined a place selection in the following way [30], p.9:
PS “a subsequence has been derived by a place selection if the
decision to retain or reject the nth element of the original sequence
depends on the number n and on label values x1, ..., xn−1 of the n− 1
preceding elements, and not on the label value of the nth element or
any following element”.
Thus a place selection can be defined by a set of functions
f1, f2(x1), f3(x1, x2), f4(x1, x2, x3), ...
each function yielding the values 0 (rejecting the nth element) or 1
(retaining the nth element).
Here are some examples of place selections:
• choose those xn for which n is prime;
• choose those xn which follow the word 01;
11A. Zeilinger commented that, although this sequence has the deterministic structure,
in principle it can be generated by some intrinsically random experiment S. May be the
probability of such output is zero, but the experimenter would be ready to see such an
event. This statement matches well with the ideology of the Kolmogorovmeasure-theoretic
approach, but not of the von Mises frequency approach. By the latter if one obtained such
a sequence, she has to question randomness of her experiment.
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• toss a (different) coin; choose xn if the nth toss yields heads.
The first two selection procedures are law-like, the third selection
random. It is clear that all of these procedures are place selections:
the value of xn is not used in determining whether to choose xn.
The principle of randomness ensures that no strategy using a place
selection rule can select a subsequence that allows different odds for
gambling than a sequence that is selected by flipping a fair coin.
Hence, can be called the law of excluded gambling strategy.
Remark 3. The Kolmogorov measure-theoretic model is solely
about probability; there is nothing about randomness. In the von
Mises frequency model randomness and probability cannot be sepa-
rated.
Remark 3. Later we shall present a variety of approaches to the
notion of randomness. The von Mises approach can be characterized
as randomness as unpredictibility (no chance to beat the roulette).
The definition (PS) suffered from the absence of the mathematical
proof of the existence of collectives. Von Mises reaction to the critique
from mathematicians side was not constructive (from the mathemati-
cians viewpoint). He told: go to casino and you will get a plenty of
random sequences, cf. with Zeilinger’s proposal on physical random-
ness section 5.4.
One can summarize the result of extended mathematical studies
on the von Mises notion of randomness as follows:
If a class of place selections is too extended then the notion of the
collective is too restricted (in fact, there are no sequences where proba-
bilities are invariant with respect to all place selections). Nevertheless,
by considering invariance of probabilities with respect to only special
classes of place selections it is possible to construct sufficiently reach
set of such “restricted collectives”.
And von Mises himself was completely satisfied with the latter
operational solution of this problem. He proposed [31] to fix a class of
place selections which depends on the physical problem and consider
the sequences of attributes in which probabilities are invariant with
respect of only this class of selections. Thus he again tried to remove
this problem outside the mathematical framework.
The frequency theory of probability is not, in fact, the calculus
of probabilities, but it is the calculus of collectives which generates
the corresponding calculus of probabilities. We briefly discuss some
of the basic operations for collectives, see [31], [13] for the detailed
presentation. We remark from the very beginning that operations for
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collectives are more complicated than the set theoretical operations.
We consider only one operation.
Operation of mixing of collectives and the basic properties of prob-
ability. Let x be a collective with the (finite) label space Lx (here
it is convenient to index label spaces by collectives) and let E =
{αj1, ..., αjk} be a subset of Lx. The sequence (18) is transformed
into a new sequence xE by the following rule (this is the operation
called by von Mises mixing). If xj ∈ E, then at the jth place there is
written 1; if xj 6∈ E then there is written 0. Thus the label set of xE
consists of two points, LxE = {0, 1}. This sequence has the property
of the statistical stabilization for its labels. For example,
PxE (1) = lim
N→∞
νN (1;xE) = lim
N→∞
νN (E;x) = lim
k∑
n=1
νN (αjn;x),
where νN (E;x) = νN (1;xE) is the relative frequency of 1 in xE which
coincides with the relative frequency of appearance of one of the labels
from E in the original collective x. Thus
PxE (1) =
k∑
n=1
Px(αjn). (19)
To obtain (19), we have only used the fact that the addition is a
continuous operation on the field of real numbers12 R.
It is possible to show that the sequence xE also satisfies the princi-
ple of randomness.13 Hence this is a new collective. By this operation
any collective x generates a probability distribution on the algebra
FLx of all subsets of Lx (we state again that we consider only finite
sets of attributes):
P (E)(≡ Px(E)) = PxE (1) =
k∑
n=1
Px(αjn). (20)
We present the properties of this probability.
12At the moment this remark that properties of (frequency) probability have some cou-
pling with inter-relation of the algebraic and topological structures on the real line can be
considered simply as a trivial statement of purely mathematical nature. However, later we
shall see that the result that additivity of probability is a consequence of the fact that R is
an additive topological group has a deep probabilistic meaning and it can lead to creation
of a family of generalized frequency probability models a la von Mises, section 6.
13Here we do not discuss the problem of existence of collectives. Suppose that they exist
or consider some special class of place selections – the restricted principle of randomness,
see section 5.1.
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• P1 Probability takes values in the segment [0, 1] of the real line.
Since P (E) = limN→∞ νN (E;x) = limN→∞
nN (E;x)
N
, and 0 ≤
νN (E;x) =
nN (E;x)
N
≤ 1, then P (E) ∈ [0, 1].
• P2 Probability that something happens equals to 1.
This is a consequence of the evident fact that for E = Lx the
collective xE does not contain zeros.
• P3 Additivity of probability.
Here we use the representation (20) of probability. If E1 and E2
are two disjoint subsets of Lx, then, for E = E1 ∪ E2,
P (E) =
∑
α∈E
P (α) =
∑
α∈E1
P (α) +
∑
α∈E2
P (α) = P (E1) + P (E2).
Thus in the von Mises theory probability is also a probability mea-
sure. However, opposite to the Kolmogorov theory, propertiesP1−P3
are theorems, not axioms. It is interesting that in his book [18] Kol-
mogorov referred to von Mises theory to justify the properties P1−P3
for the probability measure.
We recall that in the Kolmogorov model the Bayesian expression
of conditional probability is simply the definition. In the von Mises
model this is again a theorem (based on another operation for col-
lectives, so called partitions of collectives, see [29, 30, 31]). Thus
heuristically the frequency theory is better justified. However, for-
mally it is less rigorous (see [13] for an attempt to lift this theory to
the mathematical level of rigorousness).
We can say that the von Mises model was the first operational
model of probability. In some sense it has even higher level of oper-
ationalization than the quantum model of probability. In the latter
randomnesses carried by a system and a measurement device are still
separated, one is represented by a quantum state (density operator)
and another by an observer (Hermitian operator or POVM). Von Mises
collective unifies these randomnesses.
Since the frequency definition of probability induces the probability
measure on the algebra of all subsets of the set Lx of the attributes of
a random experiment inducing the collective x, one may think that the
Kolmogorov model can be considered simply as emergent from the von
Mises model. And von Mises advertised this viewpoint in his books.
Even the Kolmogorov referring to the von Mises model to justify the
axioms of the measure-theoretic probability may induce such an im-
pression. However, this is not so simple issue. Kolmogorov’s sam-
ple space Ω (endowed with the corresponding (σ)-algebra of random
events) is not the same as von Mises’ space of experiments attributes.
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For repeatable experiments, Kolmogorov’s elementary events are, in
fact, sequences of trials, so roughly speaking Kolmogorov’s probability
is defined on the set of all possible von Mises collectives. Of course,
since the Kolmogorov model is abstract, one can consider even prob-
abilities on the set of experiment’s attributes, as von Mises did. How-
ever, the latter would not correspond to repeatable experiments in the
Kolmogorov scheme.
The von Mises model can be easily extended to the case of count-
able sets of the experiment attributes, L = (α1, ...., αn, ....). However,
extension to “continuous sets of attributes”, e.g., L = R, is mathemat-
ically very difficult. It will not lead us the the notion of a measurable
set used in the theory of the Lebesgue integral.
In the measure-theoretic model of Kolmogorov the (strong) law of
large numbers is interpreted as providing the frequency interpretation
of probability. Von Mises did not agree with such an interpretation.
He claimed that, opposite to his principle of the statistical stabiliza-
tion guarantying convergence of relative frequencies to the probability
in each concrete collective (random sequence), the law of large num-
bers is a purely mathematical statement which has no direct relation
to experiment. His main critical argument was that knowing some-
thing with probability one is totally meaningless if one need to know
something about the concrete random sequence.
Thus one can say that in the development of probability we selected
the pathway based on a simpler mathematics and rejected the pathway
based on our heuristic picture of probability and randomness.
5 Random sequences
5.1 Approach of Richard von Mises: random-
ness as unpredictability
Von Mises did not solve the problem of the existence of collectives.
Immediately after his proposal on collectives, mathematicians started
to ask whether such sequences exist at all. One of the first objection
was presented by E. Kamke, see, e.g., [13] and it is well known as
Kamke’s objection.
The principle of randomness of von Mises implies on stability of
limits of frequencies with respect to the set of all possible place se-
lections. Kamke claimed that there are no sequences satisfying this
principle. Here we reproduce his argument.
Let L = {0, 1} be the label set and let x = (x1, ..., xn, ...), xj ∈ L,
be a collective which induces the probability distribution P : P (0) =
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P (1) = 1/2. Now we consider the set Sincreasing of all strictly increasing
sequences of natural numbers, its elements have the form k = (n1 <
n2 < nm < ...), where nj, j = 1, 2, ... are natural numbers. This set can
be formed independently of the collective x. However, among elements
of Sincreasing, we can find the strictly increasing sequence {n : xn = 1}.
This sequence define a place selection which selects the subsequence
(1, 1, ..., 1, ...) from the sequence x. Hence, the sequence x (for which
we originally supposed that it is a collective) is not a collective after
all!
However, the mathematical structure of Kamke’s argument was
not completely convincing. He claimed to have shown that for every
putative collection x there exists a place selection φ that changes the
limits of frequencies. But the use of the existential quantifier here is
classical (Platonistic). Indeed, it seems impossible to exhibit explicitly
a procedure which satisfies von Mises criterion (independence on the
value xn) and at the same time selects the subsequence (1, 1, 1, ...)
from the original sequence x. In any event Kamke’s argument played
an important role in understanding that to create the mathematically
rigorous theory of collectives one has to restrict the class of place
selections.14
The simplest way (at least from the mathematical viewpoint) is to
proceed with special classes of lawlike place selections. In particular,
A. Church proposed to consider place selections in which the selec-
tion functions fn(x1, ..., xn−1) are algorithmically computable. (We
recall that fn is used to select/not the nth element of a sequence
x = (x1, ..., xn, ...). It is important to note that the set of all Church-
like place selections is countable, see, e.g., [?]. The existence of
Church’s collectives is a consequence of the general result of Abra-
ham Wald [34] which we formulate now.
Let p = (pj = P (αj)) be a probability distribution on the label
set L = {α1, ..., αm}. Denote the set of all possible sequences with
elements from L by the symbol L∞. Let φ be a place selection. For
x ∈ L∞, the symbol φx is used to denote the subsequence of x obtained
with the aid of this place selection.
Let U be some family of place selections. We set
X(U ; p) = {x ∈ L∞ : ∀φ ∈ U lim
N→∞
νn(αj ;φx) = pj, j = 1, ...,m},
14The work of Kamke as well as other works devoted to the analysis of the von Mises
principle of the place selection also played the fundamental role in setting the foundations
of theory of algorithms and constructive mathematics. In the latter the arguments similar
to the Kamke objection are taken into account, because they are not based on constructive
(algorithmically performable) proofs.
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where as usual νN (α; y), α ∈ L, denotes the relative frequency of the
appearance of the label α among the first N elements of the sequence
y ∈ L∞.
Theorem 2. (Wald). For any countable set U of place selec-
tions and any probability distribution p on the label set L, the set of
sequences X(U ; p) has the cardinality of the continuum.
By Wald’s theorem for any countable set of place selections U the
frequency theory of probability can be developed at the mathematical
level of rigorousness. R. von Mises was completely satisfied by this
situation (see [31]).
However, a new cloud appeared on the sky. This was the famous
Villes objection [28].
Theorem 3. (Ville). Let L = {0, 1} and let U = {φn} be a
countable set of place selections. Then there exists x ∈ L∞ such that
• for all n,
lim
N→∞
N∑
j=1
(φnx)j = 1/2;
• for all N,
N∑
j=1
(φnx)j ≥ 1/2.
Such a sequence x of zeros and ones is a collective with respect to
U, x ∈ X(U ; 1/2), but seems to be far too regular to be called random.
At the same time from the measure-theoretic viewpoint the exis-
tence of such sequences is not a problem. The set of such sequences
has the Lebesgue measure zero.
We recall that any sequence of zeros and ones can be identified
with a real number from the segment [0, 1] :
x = (x1, ..., xN , ...)→ r = x1/2 + ...+ xN/p
N+1 + ... ∈ R
On this segment we have the linear Lebesgue measure which is defined
through its values on intervals: µ([a, b)) = b − a. And the previous
statement is about this measure.
Here we see the difference between the treatment of randomness
as unpredictability (a la von Mises) and as typicality (see section 5.2
for the latter – theory of Martin Lo¨f).
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5.2 Approach of Per Martin Lo¨f: randomness
as typicality
Ville used Theorem 3 to argue that collectives in the sense of von Mises
and Wald do not necessarily satisfy all intuitively required properties
of randomness.
Jean Ville introduced [28] a new way of characterizing random
sequences, based on the following principle:
Ville’s Principle: A random sequence should satisfy all properties
of probability one.
Each property is considered as determining a test of randomness.
According to Ville [28], a sequence can be considered as a random if
it passes all possible tests for randomness.
However, this is impossible: we have to choose countably many
from among those properties (otherwise the intersection of the un-
countable family of set of probability 1 can have probability less than
1 or simply be nonmeasurable; in the latter case the probability is not
defined at all). Countable families of properties (tests for random-
ness) can be selected in various ways. A random sequence passing one
countable sequence of tests can be rejected by another. This brings
ambiguity in the Ville approach to randomness as typicality (i.e., hold-
ing some property with probability one).
It must be underlined that the Ville principle is really completely
foreign to von Mises. For von Mises, a collective x ∈ L∞ induces a
probability on the set of labels L, not on the set of all sequences L∞.
Hence, for von Mises (and other scientists interpreting randomness
as unpredictability in an individual sequence), there is no connection
between properties of probability one in L∞ and properties of an in-
dividual collective.
Later (in 1970th) Per Martin-Lo¨f (motivated by the talk of An-
drei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov at the Moscow Probability Seminar) [24]
solved the problem of ambiguity of the Ville interpretation of ran-
domness as typicality. He proposed to consider recursive properties of
probability one, i.e., the properties which can be tested with the aid of
algorithms. Such an approach induces the fruitful theory of recursive
tests for randomness (see, for example, [25], [26]). The key point of
this “algorithmic tests” approach to the notion of randomness is that
it is possible to prove that there exists the universal algorithmic test.
A sequence is considered as random if it passes this universal test.
Thus the class of typicality-random sequences is well defined. Un-
fortunately, this universal test of randomness cannot be constructed
algorithmically (although by itself it is an algorithmic process). There-
fore, although we have the well defined class of Martin Lo¨f random
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sequences, we do not know how the universal test for such random-
ness looks. Hence, for the concrete sequence of trials we cannot check
algorithmically whether it is random or not – although we know that
it is possible to perform such algorithmic check.
So, as in the case of von Mises/Wald randomness (as unpredictabil-
ity), Ville/Martin Lo¨f randomness (as typicality) cannot be considered
as satisfactory.
Finally, we remark that similar approach, randomness as (recur-
sive) typicality, was developed by Schnorr [27].15
5.3 Approach of Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov:
randomness as complexity
It is well know that personally A. N. Kolmogorov was not satisfied by
his own measure-theoretic approach to probability (private commu-
nications of his former students). He sympathized to the von Mises
approach to probability for which randomness was not less fundamen-
tal than probability. In 60th he turned again to the foundations of
probability and randomness and tried to find foundations of random-
ness by reducing this notion to the notion of complexity. Thus in
short the Kolmogorov approach can be characterized as randomness
as complexity. Another basic point of his approach is that complexity
of a sequence has to be checked algorithmically.
Let L = {0, 1}. Denote by L∗ the set of all finite sequences (words)
in the alphabet L.
Definition 8.1 (Kolmogorov). Let A be an arbitrary algorithm.
The complexity of a word x with respect to A is KA(x) = min l(pi),
where {pi} are the programs which are able to realize the word x with
the aid of A.
Here l(pi) denotes the length of a program pi. This definition de-
pends on the structure of an algorithm A. Later Kolmogorov proved
the following fundamental theorem:
Theorem 4. There exists an algorithm A0 (optimal algorithm)
such that, for any algorithm A, there exists a constant C > 0,
KA0(x) ≤ KA(x) + C. (21)
It has to be pointed out that optimal algorithm is not unique.
15We state again that approaches of Martin-Lof and Schnorr (as well as Ville) have noth-
ing to do with the justification of Mises’ frequency probability theory and his viewpoint
on randomness as unpredictability.
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The complexity K(x) of the word x is (by definition) equal to the
complexity KA0(x) with respect to one fixed (for all considerations)
optimal algorithm A0.
The original idea of Kolmogorov [21, 22, 23] was that complexity
K(x1:n) of the initial segments x1:n of a random sequence x has to
have the asymptotic ∼ n
K(x1:n) ∼ n, n→∞, (22)
i.e., we might not find a short code for x1:n.
However, this heuristically attractive idea idea was rejected as a
consequence of the objection of Per Martin-Lo¨f [26].
To discuss this objection and connection of the Kolmogorov complexity-
randomness with Martin-Lo¨f typicality-randomness, we proceed with
conditional Kolmogorov complexityK(x;n), instead of complexityK(x).
Conditional complexity K(x;n) is defined as the length of the minimal
program pi which produces the output x on the basis of information
that the length of the output x is equal to n.
Theorem 5. (Martin Lo¨f) For every binary sequence x,
K(x1:n;n) < n− log2 n, (23)
for infinitely many n.
Hence, Kolmogorov random sequences, in the sense of the defini-
tion (22), do not exit.
Another problem of the Kolmogorov approach to randomness as al-
gorithmic complexity is that we “do not know” any optimal algorithm
A0, i.e., the Kolmogorov complexity is not algorithmically computable.
However, the latter problem can be partially fixed, because there ex-
ist algorithmic methods to estimate this complexity (from above and
below).
We remark that historically the Kolmogorov algorithmic complex-
ity approach to the notion of randomness preceded the Martin Lo¨f
recursive test approach and Per Martin Lo¨f as staying in Moscow at
that time was influenced by the ideas of Kolmogorov.
Finally, we remark that numerical evaluation of the Kolmogorov
complexity for binary sequences produced in experiments with quantum
systems is an open and interesting problem.
5.4 Randomness: concluding remarks
As we have seen, non of the three basic mathematical approaches to
the notion of randomness (based on unpredictability, typicality, and
algorithmic complexity) led to the consistent and commonly accepted
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theory of randomness. Can we hope to create such a mathematical the-
ory? As was already remarked, Kolmogorov died with the hope that
in future a new and unexpected approach to the notion of randomness
will be elaborated. And, of course, mathematicians will continue to
work on this problem. However, it may happen that future attempts
will never lead to a mathematically acceptable notion of randomness.
This was the final point of my first lecture given at IQOQI.
In the after-talk discussion various opinion were presented; in par-
ticular, prof. Zeilinger conjectured that such a painful process of elab-
oration of the mathematical theory of randomness is simply a conse-
quence of the methodological mistreatment of this notion. It might
be that randomness is not mathematical, but physical notion. Thus
one has to elaborate physical procedures guarantying randomness of
experimentally produced sequences and not simply try to construct
such procedures mathematically. In some sense Zeilinger’s proposal is
consonant with von Mises’ proposal: to find a collective, one simply
has to go to casino.
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6 Appendix: Around the Kolmogorov
measure-theoretic and von Mises fre-
quency axiomatics
6.1 On generalizations of the measure-theoretic
probability theory
Kolmogorov by himself did not consider his axiomatics as something
final and unchangeable. He discussed various possible modifications
of the axiomatics. In particular, for him the request that the collec-
tion of all possible events has to form a σ-algebra or even an algebra
of sets was questionable. He proposed some models of “generalized
probability” where the collection of events need not have the stan-
dard structure of (σ-)algebra.
However, later the modern axiomatics of probability was so to say
“crystallized” and any departure from the Kolmogorov axiomatics was
considered as a kind of pathology.
Nevertheless, the concrete applications continuously generate novel
models in which probabilities have some unusual features. For ex-
ample, in psychology and game theory non-additive “probabilities”
were invented and actively used, see, e.g., [16] for references. We also
mention “negative probabilities” which were explored in the works of
Dirac, Feynman, Aspect and my own works, see [1], [3], [13]; see also
Mu¨ckenheim [6] for the detailed review on negative probabilities in
quantum physics. Dirac even used “complex probabilities” [2].
6.2 Negative probabilities
“Negative probabilities” appear with strange regularity in majority of
problems of quantum theory starting with Dirac relativistic quantiza-
tion of the electromagnetic field. Feynman was sure that all quantum
processes can written with the aid of negative transition probabilities
which disappear in the final answers corresponding to the results of
measurements. Of course, the interpretation of signed measures tak-
ing, in particular, negative values as probabilities (in particular, the
use of signed density functions) are counterintuitive. Nevertheless, op-
eration with such generalized probabilities is less counterintuitive than
operation in the formal quantum framework. One can say (as Feyn-
man often did) that the only difference between classical and quantum
physics is that in the latter one has to use generalization of the Kol-
mogorov measure-theoretic model with signed measures, instead of
positive measures.
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The mathematical formalism of theory of negative probabilities
was presented in my book [12] (and its completed edition [13]). Math-
ematically this is a trivial generalization of the Kolmogorov notion of
probability space.
Let again Ω be a set and let F be a σ-algebra of its subsets. A
signed probability measure P is a map from F to the segment R nor-
malized P (Ω) = 1 and σ-additive. The signed probability space [12]
is a triple P = (Ω, F , P ). Points ω of Ω are said to be elementary
events, elements of F are random events, P is signed probability.
If such a “probability” takes negative values, then automatically it
has to take values exceeding 1. It is easy to show. Take an event A such
that P (A) < 0. Take its complement B = Ω \A. Then additivity and
normalization by 1 imply that P (Ω) = P (A∪B) = P (A)+P (B) = 1,
i.e., P (B) > 1.
On the basis of the signed probability space it is possible to pro-
ceed quite far by generalizing the basic notions and constructions of
the standard probability theory: conditional probabilities are defined
by the Bayes formula, independence is defined via factorizing of proba-
bility, the definition of a random variable is the same as in the standard
approach, average (mean value) is given by the integral.16
The complex probability space is defined in the same way; here
“probabilities” are normalized σ-additive functions taking values in
the field of complex numbers C.
The prejudice against such generalized probabilities is the result of
a few centuries of the use of the Laplacian definition of probability as
the proportion P (A) = m/n, where m is the number of cases favoring
to the event A and the m is the total number of possible cases. Take,
for example, a coin, then here n = 2 and, for the event H that the head
will appear in one of trials, m = 1. Hence, P (H) = 1/2. For the dice,
we shall get probabilities P (Aj) = 1/6, where the index j = 1, 2, .., 6
labels the corresponding sides of the dice. It is clear that the Laplacian
probability cannot be negative or exceed 1. However, the domain of
application of the Laplacian probability is very restricted. For exam-
ple, it can be used only for symmetric coins and dices. (Nevertheless,
since the Laplacian probability is the starting point of all traditional
courses in probability theory, the notion of probability is often asso-
ciated precisely with its Laplacian version. In particular, this image
of probability was strongly criticized by Richard von Mises [30, 31].)
If one assign weights to events by using not only the Laplacian rule
16We remark that each signed measure can be canonically represented as the difference
of two positive measures (the Jordan decomposition of a signed measure). Thus one can
define the integral with respect to a signed measure as the difference of integrals with
respect to these two positive measures.
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(which is applicable only in very special cases), then, in principle, one
may try to use any real number as the weight of an event. There is
the order structure on the real line. Thus it is possible to compare
probabilities and to say that one event is more probable than another.
Hence, the (b)-part of the Kolmogorov interpretation of probability,
see section 3.3, is also applicable to signed probabilities.
For signed probabilities, the possibility to use the frequency inter-
pretation of probability, the (a)-part of the Kolmogorov interpretation
(see section 3.3), is a more delicate question. Surprisingly there were
obtained analogs of the law of large numbers and the central limit
theorem.17 However, it is impossible to obtain such a strong type of
convergence as we have for the standard positive probabilities. For
example, in the generalized law of large numbers the arithmetic mean
need not converge to the probabilistic meanm almost everywhere. For
identically distributed and independent random variables ξ1, ..., ξN , ...,
with the mean value m = Eξj =
∫
Ω ξj(ω)dP (ω), it can happen that
P
(
ω ∈ Ω :
ξ1(ω) + ...+ ξN (ω)
N
→ m,N →∞
)
6= 1. (24)
Nevertheless, a weaker convergence is still possible. Set
ηN =
ξ1(ω) + ...+ ξN (ω)
N
.
Then it is possible to show that, for a sufficiently extended class of
functions, f : R → R, the following form of the weak convergence
takes place:
Ef(ηN ) =
∫
Ω
f(ηN (ω))dP (ω)→ f(m), N →∞. (25)
We remark that, for the standard positive probability, the limit rela-
tion (25) holds for all bounded continuous functions (this is a conse-
quence of the strong law of large numbers). For generalized, signed or
complex, probabilities (or even with values in Banach algebras) func-
tions for which (25) holds have to have some degree of smoothness
[4].
17 It is convenient to proceed with complex “probabilities”, i.e., by considering the
signed probabilities as a particular case of complex probabilities, see [4] for the most
general case: the limit theorems were derived for “probabilities” taking values in complex
Banach (super)algebras. This possibility to generalize the basic limit theorems of the
standard probability theory to real and complex valued probability measures (as well as
to more general measures) is also a supporting argument to use, e.g., negative probabilities.
Sometimes mathematics can lead us to areas where our intuition deos not work.
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6.3 On generalizations of the frequency theory
of probability
Another way to obtain the frequency interpretation of negative prob-
abilities is to use the number-theoretic approach based on so called
p-adic numbers. The starting point is that frequencies νn = n/N are
always rational numbers. We recall that the set of rational numbers
Q is a dense subset in the set of real numbersR, i.e., the real numbers
can be obtained as limits of rational numbers. Von Mises implicitly
explored this number-theoretic fact in the formulation of the principle
of the statistical stabilization of relative frequencies. For example, the
probability of an event is a real number (in [0, 1]), because he consid-
ered one special convergence on Q, namely, with respect to the metric
induced from R : ρR(x, y) = |x − y|. The additivity of the frequency
probability is the result of the continuity of the operation of addition
with respect to this metric. It can shown [13] that to get the Bayes
formula, one has to use the continuity of the operation of division in
R \ {0}. Thus the von Mises theory of frequency probability is based
on the dense embedding
Q ⊂ R. (26)
It is important thatR is a topological field, i.e., all algebraic operations
on it are continuous.
This analysis of the number-theoretic-topological structure of the
von Mises model leads us to the following natural question:
Is it possible to find dense embedding of the set of rational num-
bers Q (representing all relative frequencies) into another topological
number field K, Q ⊂ K?
If the answer were positive, then one would be able to extend the
domain of application of the principle of the statistical stabilization
of von Mises: to consider the problem of the existence of the limits
of relative frequencies in the topology of the number field K. Since
the standard properties of probability were based on the consistency
between the algebraic and topological structures, one can expect that,
for a topological field, the corresponding generalization of the (fre-
quency) probability theory will be very similar to the standard one
based on the embedding (26).
6.4 p-adic probability
It is interesting that there are not so many ways to construct dense
embeddings ofQ ⊂ K (in other words: to complete the field of rational
numbers with respect to some metric and to obtain a topological field).
By the famous theorem of number theory, the Ostrowsky theorem, all
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“natural embeddings” are reduced to the fields of so called p-adic
numbers Qp, where p = 2, 3, ..., 1997, 1999, ... are prime numbers. The
elements of these fields have the form:
a =
∞∑
j=k
ajp
j, aj = 0, 1, .., p − 1,
where k is an integer; in particular, for p = 2 this a binary expansion.
We recall that each real number can be represented as
a =
k∑
−∞
ajp
j, aj = 0, 1, .., p − 1.
Thus a real number can contain infinitely many terms with the neg-
ative powers of p and a p-adic number can contain infinitely many
terms with the positive powers of p.
In principle, for some sequences x = (x1, ..., xn, ...) of the results of
trials (where xj ∈ L and L is the corresponding label set), the limits
of relative frequencies may exist not in R, but in one of Qp. Such a
“collective” wil generate probabilities belonging not to R, but to Qp.
One have not to overestimate the exoticness of such “probabilities”.
One has to understand well that the real numbers (opposite to the
rational numbers) are just symbols (representing limits of sequence of
rational numbers); the p-adic numbers are similar symbols.
Foundations of the p-adic probability theory can be found in [13].
This theory was developed in the framework of p-adic theoretcial.One
of the interesting mathematical facts about such generalized proba-
bilities is that the range of the values of p-adic probabilities coincides
with Qp, i.e., any p-adic number can be in principle obtained as the
limit of relative frequencies, a = limN→∞ n/N (cf. with the standard
frequency probability theory which implies that the range of values
of probability coincides with the segment [0, 1] of the real line). In
particular, any rational number (including negative numbers) can be
obtained in this way.
Therefore in the p-adic framework “negative probabilities” appear
in the natural way. Typically convergence of a sequence of rational
numbers (in particular, relative frequencies) in Qp implies that this
sequence does not converge in R and vice versa, see [5] for examples.
In this framework the appearance of the p-adic and, in particular,
negative probabilities, can be interpreted as a sign of irregular (from
the viewpoint of the standard probability theory) statistical behavior,
as a violation of the basic principle of the standard probability theory:
the principle of the statistical stabilization of relative frequencies (with
respect to the real metric on Q). In the measure-theoretic approach
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this situation can be considered as a violation of the law of large
numbers.
In short: negative probability means that, for some event A, in
the standard decimal (or binary) expansion of the relative frequencies
νN (A) = n(A)/N the digits would not stabilize when N → ∞. We
remark that, in principle, there is nothing mystical in such behavior
of data, see again for examples [5].
6.5 Violation of the principle of the statistical
stabilization for hidden variables?
As was pointed out, for Feynman and Aspect hidden variables have
to be described by signed probability distributions. In the light of the
previous considerations this statement can be interpreted in the very
natural manner: relative frequencies for hidden variables, νN (λ) =
nN (λ)/N, do not satisfy the principle of the statistical stabilization.
In this way the realism can be saved: the local hidden variables are
not forbidden, but the principles of the standard probability theory
are not applicable to them. However, it is not clear whether such a
viewpoint leads to reestablishing of realism at the subquantum level.
My personal impression is that realism by itself is nothing else than
the acceptance of the global validity of the principle of the statistical
stabilization (the law of large numbers). In seems that all our senses
were formed to recognize only statistically repeatable phenomena (and
what is important: statistically repeatable with respect to the real
metric). As a consequence all our measurement devices are designed
to observe only such phenomena.18
What is still unclear for me is how the continuous space-time struc-
ture (modeled with the aid of real numbers) is transferred into the sta-
tistical stabilization of frequencies of observed events. It is clear that
all our measurement devices explore this space-time structure. Are
they just machines which transfer features of the continuous space-
time into relative frequencies stabilizing with respect to the real met-
ric and leading to the standard models of probability? or another way
around? Do we get the standard model of space-time just because our
senses are based on the principle of the statistical stabilization with
respect to the real metric? In fact, the convergence with respect to the
real metric is based on the agreement that for large N its inverse 1/N
18To be honest, I was not able to find experimental statistical data violating the standard
principle of the statistical stabilization. Although in the book [5] the reader can find various
examples of stochastic evolution of biological systems in which statistical data violate the
principle of the statistical stabilization, these data is so to say about hidden features of
such biological evolutions.
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is a small quantity, if N is very large than 1/N is negligibly small and
it can be neglected. Is this the essence of modern probability theory
and even the modern science in general?
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